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NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT BOARD DIRECTORS AND TRAINING 
HOURS AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF 
TSEC ELECTRONIC COMPANIES 
By Fu-Huei Yang 
September, 2006 
Abstract 
In February 2002, the regulation of appointing independent directors in the 
boardroom was set forth in "Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for 
TSECIGTSM Listed Companies" (CGBPP). Since the enactment of the amended 
"Security and Exchange Act" in 2006, all listed companies are required to appoint 
independent directors, not less than two in number and not less than one-fifth of the total 
number of directors. 
In addition to implementing the independent directors system, in order to enhance 
director competencies and director behavior, the TSEC announced the "Guideline for 
Promotion of Advanced Study by Directors and Supervisors of TSECIGTSM Listed 
Companies." In this guideline, a newly recruited director of TSEC listed companies is 
advised to take at least 12 hours of training courses for the recruitment year, and at least 3 
hours for each of the following years of tenure. 
The purpose of this exploratory (comparative) and explanatory (correlational) 
study was to examine the differences between the absence or presence of independent 
directors on company performance of TSEC listed electronic companies, and the 
relationship between the number of independent directors and the number of board 
training hours and company performance of TSEC listed electronic companies. 
In this study, independent directors were measured by the absence or presence of 
the independent directors and their number in the boardroom. Board members' training 
was measured by the total training hours of the board. Company performance was 
measured by financial indicators in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS. Findings indicated 
that the presence of independent directors was associated with significantly higher 
company's financial performance for TSEC electronic companies. Results of simple 
regression analyses indicated that the number of board training hours significantly 
explained about 1% of financial performance of TSEC listed electronic companies. 
Results of multiple regression analyses demonstrated that the number of independent 
directors and the number of board of directors training hours were significant explanatory 
variables of about 7% of financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of TSEC listed 
electronic companies. Interpretations, implications, conclusions, and recommendations 
for future study are discussed. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Introduction and Background to the Problem 
The breakthrough news of corporate debacles such as the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals has shocked industries, capital markets, and investors around the world in the 
beginning years of the 21'' century. People are suspicious of the effectiveness of 
corporate governance. For the past two decades, the study of corporate governance "has 
focused on the independence of directors and the separation of the CEO and chair" 
(Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 1). 
A vast amount of research demonstrates that there is no significant relationship 
between director independence and corporate performance (Westphal, 2002; Bhagat & 
Black, 2002). Nonetheless, after interviewing 194 corporate directors, regulators, and 
shareholders about corporate governance, Leblanc and Gillies (2003) found most held the 
view that "a relationship does exist between corporate governance and the financial 
success of the corporation" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 1). Therefore, the missing link 
between corporate governance and company performance is proposed to be board process 
(referring to the board decision-making procedure) and effectiveness, rather than just 
board structure (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003). 
According to Leblanc and Gillies, there are three pillars constituting an effective 
board-board structure, board membership, and board process. Board structure is 
analyzed "from the perspective of having a separate chair, a majority of outside directors, 
and an optimal size" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 2). Moreover, the independence of 
directors has been conventionally the most important issue associated with board 
structure. Board membership is defined as "how directors come to be recruited onto a 
board, the balanced competencies of existing members, and the methods that are taken to 
remove a director from a board" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 7). Board process is 
defined as "how directors make decisions and the behavior of the individual directors" 
(Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 7). 
"Nearly two decades of research find little evidence that board independence 
enhances board effectiveness. Studies have, however, found a negative effect" 
(Westphal, 2002, p. 6). Therefore, Leblanc and Gillies (2003) propose a new model of 
board effectiveness, and emphasize that a board of directors for its effectiveness "needs 
to have the right board structure, supported by the right board membership, and engaged 
in the right board processes" (p. 6). "An effective board must be built on a foundation 
of members who are independent. But it must have two additional features" (p. 7). 
Firstly, "it must be made up of members with the competencies required by the 
corporation to fulfill its strategies and to meet its obligations" (p. 7). Secondly, "the 
members must be able to work together to come to effective decisions" (p. 7). 
Consequently, a board is only as effective as its directors. Three factors define the 
effectiveness of a board member: 1) director independence; 2) director competencies; 
and 3) director behavior (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003). 
Regulatory director independence can be easily accomplished by legislative 
efforts. A survey of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) members also supported a trend toward the American model of corporate 
governance. This has developed in recent years due to global competition in terms of 
manufacturing industries or international capital markets (Nester & Thompson, 2001). 
Moreover, "the OECD and the World Bank are committed to assisting governments in 
evaluating and improving the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate 
governance in their countries" (OECD, 2004, p. I). 
The regulatory independence of directors has been widely adopted in different 
kinds of corporate governance systems around the world since the passage and 
enforcement of SOA, and the subsequent revised rules of the NYSE and NASDAQ stock 
markets (NYSE, 2002 & NASDAQ, 2002). Wade (2002) stated, "I was surprised to find 
discussions.. .that include corporate governance reform that moves Japan, Canada, and 
Germany closer to the U.S. corporate governance paradigm" (p. 441). 
For the other two factors of director competencies and director behavior, things 
seem to be too complicated to incorporate them into individual companies only by 
legislation. "The choice of directors is most often a result of the interaction among the 
various actors" (Huse, 2005, p. 5). Measures of director competencies "include the 
directors' general, functional, firm-specific and board-specific knowledge and skills. 
Relational, social and intellectual capacity or capability may also be included as 
competencies" (Huse, 2005, p. 5). 
As reported by Huse (2005), Sundaramurthy and Lewis claimed the dynamism of 
actual board behavior and corporate governance is rooted in various learning and 
influencing loops. "The learning processes take place at various levels: societal and 
institutional, organizational, group and individual" (Huse, 2005, p. 5). 
In February 2002, the regulation of appointing independent directors in the 
boardroom was set forth in "Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for 
TSECIGTSM Listed Companies" (CGBPP). In order to reform Taiwan's corporate 
governance system, the Taiwanese government organized "The Group for Implementing 
Corporate Governance" (the -'Groupx) in July 2003 to review and promulgate the 
amended version of CGBPP on December 3 1,2003 (TSEC, 2006). Until the enactment 
of the amended "Security and Exchange Act" in 2006, all the listed companies are 
required to appoint independent directors, not less than two in number and not less than 
one-fifth of the total number of directors (Taiwan Security and Exchange Act, 2006). 
Besides implementing the independent directors system, in order to enhance 
director competencies and director behavior, the Taiwan Securities Exchange 
Corporation (TSEC) drew up and promulgated amendatory reference samples of 
"Procedures for Electing Directors and Supervisors," "Rules Governing the Conduct of 
Shareholders Meeting," and "Organization Rules for Directors and Supervisors 
Nomination Committee" (TSEC, 2006). Additionally, to encourage directors' 
continuous learning and training, TSEC conducted research and promulgated "Guideline 
for Promotion of Advanced Study by Directors and Supervisors of TSECIGTSM Listed 
Companies" (TSEC, 2006). In the guideline, a new recruited director of TSEC listed 
companies is advised to take at least 12 hours training courses for the recruiting year, and 
at least 3 hours for the following year of tenure. 
The independent directors system and board training guideline are enacted to 
enhance corporate governance effectiveness and company performance to avoid the 
disasters of corporate scandals that cause investors' enormous losses and affect their 
confidence in the investment market. Thus, shareholders' confidence, the board's 
accountability, and the securities market's fairness and justice can be restored and 
protected as well. In this study, the independent directors system was examined to 
confirm its impact on company's financial performance, and the board training provision 
was examined to determine its relationship to company's financial performance. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to examine the differences between the presence or 
absence of independent directors on company performance of TSEC listed electronic 
companies, and the relationship between board training and company performance of 
TSEC listed electronic companies. The specific purposes of this quantitative 
causal-comparative and correlational study were: (1) to determine if there is a significant 
difference in company performance between two groups of listed Taiwanese electronic 
companies either appointing independent directors, or not appointing independent 
directors; (2) to examine the explanatory relationship between the number of independent 
directors on company performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS, in TSEC electronic 
companies; (3) to examine the explanatory relationship between board members' training 
and company performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS in TSEC electronic 
companies; and (4) to examine the explanatory relationship between the number of 
independent board directors and the number of training hours and company performance 
(ROA, ROE, and EPS). 
Definition of Terms 
Independent Variable: Independent Directors 
Theoretical Definition 
An independent director occurs when "the board of directors affirmatively 
determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company, either 
directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship 
with the company" (NYSE, 2002, Section 303A, para. 1). 
Operational Definition # I :  Presence or Absence of Independent Directors 
In this study, operational definition #1 of independent directors was defined by 
the presence or absence of independent directors. Please refer to Appendix 
A-Secondary Data of TSEC Website, (1 ,  0), which indicates if the listed company has 
at least one independent director, or none (EXIND). 
Operational Definition #2: Number of Independent Directors 
In this study, for operational definition #2 of independent director was defined by 
the number of independent directors. Please refer to Appendix A (NOIND). 
According to Market Open Posting System (M.O.P.S.) of TSEC, the largest number of 
independent directors for all of the listed electronic companies is four, as of February 15, 
2006. Moreover, only one company had four independent directors. All of the other 
listed electronic companies that had 0, 1, 2, or 3 independent directors were included in 
the study. 
Independent Variable: Board Training 
Theoretical Definition 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) characterize director's knowledge and skills which 
may be obtained through training on two main dimensions: 1) business management 
functional knowledge and skills, and 2) firm-specific knowledge and skills. Board 
members of listed TSEC companies are advised by CGBP regulations to "participate in 
training courses of finance, business, commerce, accounting or law, which cover subjects 
relating to corporate governance upon becoming directors and throughout their terms of 
occupancy" (CGBPP, 2002, Article 40 & 51, Chapter 111). 
Operational Definition: Board Training Hours 
In this study, to measure board training, all of the board members' training hours 
taken through certified training institutions and reported to TSEC, were used for analysis. 
Refer to Appendix A. On M.O.P.S. of TSEC, board members' training hours are 
disclosed, posted, and updated when they take the certified training courses regarding 
corporate governance. 
Dependent Variable: Company Financial Performance 
Theoretical Definition 
Indicators of good company performance are defined financially in terms of sales, 
return on assets (ROA), and market value (Colley, Doyle, Logan, & Stettinius, 2003). 
Company performance may also include addressing interests of political and social 
constituents (Detomasi, 2002; Salacuse, 2002). 
Operational Definition (ROA, ROE, EPS) 
In this study, three commonly-used measures of a company's financial 
performance are: return on total assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and earning per 
share (EPS). Refer to Appendix A. Data were collected from M.O.P.S. of the TSEC 
website for the individual company's financial analysis. 
Justification 
This study is justified by considering its significance, contributions to empirical 
validity of theories, the extent to which it is a researchable topic, and the feasibility of 
this study. This study has the potential to contribute to the implementation of corporate 
governance regulation, to board training, and to the effectiveness of boards of directors 
for Taiwan's listed companies. 
This study fills research gaps of empirical studies examining the effect of 
independent directors on company performance in Taiwan, and the relationship between 
board training and company performance in the literature of corporate governance. The 
board members of listed companies are advised to take training courses accumulated by 
hours (TSEC, 2006). These training hours are regarded as significant information, 
which is to be disclosed to the public. Therefore, to examine its relationship to 
company performance is beneficial for confirming the effect of this government 
regulation on corporate governance. The board of directors of listed companies is 
required to appoint at least two independent directors in the boardroom (Company Act, 
2006, Chapter V, Section 4). Therefore, the number of independent directors in the 
boardroom is recognized as being beneficial to corporate governance and company 
performance. It is also significant to examine the validity of this regulation on company 
performance. 
This study was feasible because it could be implemented in a reasonable amount 
of time, and reliable data was available on the official website. Variables in the 
theoretical frameworks were able to be explored. 
Delimitations and Scope 
1. Research of independent directors and company performance is limited to the listed 
electronic public companies in Taiwan, which has a hybrid corporate governance 
model but approaching the American market model. Additionally, they are 
attributed to high-tech industries, which are currently recognized as the most 
important industries in Taiwan, and have the similarity of board functions and 
dynamics (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). 
2. In this study, the target population was limited to the electronic public companies 
currently listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC). As of August 9, 
2006, there were 304 electronic companies listed on TSEC (TSEC, 2006). 
3. This study examined the effect of independent directors, because the exercise of the 
board of directors in Taiwan is approaching the American model, which has directors 
in the boardroom only. 
Chapter I provided an introduction to the study about the relationship between the 
number of independent board directors and training hours and financial performance of 
TSEC electronic companies. This introduction section discussed the problem of 
corporate governance scandals around the world in the twenty-first century, and the 
background of corporate governance systems and reforms in Taiwan. The purpose of 
the study relating to the implementation of independent directors and board directors' 
training was described. Definitions of terms both theoretical and operational definitions 
presented for each variable were defined. The delimitations of the study were also 
identified. The study was justified because of its significance, researchability, and 
feasibility. Chapter I1 presents the literature review, theoretical framework, research 
question and hypotheses identified for this study about corporate governance, board 
effectiveness, independent directors, board training and corporate governance reforms in 
Taiwan. 
CHAPTER I1 
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, RESEARCH 
QUESTION, AND HYPOTHESES 
Introduction 
In the beginning years of the 21St century, the breakthrough news of corporate 
debacles such as the Enron and WorldCom scandals has shocked industries, capital 
markets, and investors around the world. For decades, business failures have not been 
absent from the business headlines; however, none were like these. They resulted in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA), as well as the subsequent renewal regulations at the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ stock markets. 
Since the financial crises in East Asia (1997-98) and the legislation of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the American market system of corporate governance is evolving all 
over the world (Heeren & Rickers, 2003). According to Banks (2004), three models of 
corporate governance (the marker model, the relationship model, and the hybrid model) 
exist in numerous countries. These corporate governance systems have different 
strengths and weaknesses. Among many important issues of corporate governance, 
independent directors and board independence is one of the most critical and most talked 
about topics. 
A vast amount of research has demonstrated that there is no significant 
relationship between director independence and corporate performance. Instead, board 
process (referring to the board decision-making procedure) is proposed to be the key 
factor of company performance (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003). 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a state-of-the-art review of theoretical 
literature and empirical studies about corporate governance, boards of directors, and the 
relationship between independent directors and company performance and board training, 
to examine factors that may have a positive impact on board effectiveness or company 
performance, to identify problem areas that negatively influence the effectiveness of 
independent directors, to identify strategies that promote better board process and 
effective govemance, and to identify areas for future scholarly inquiry. Moreover, to 
examine current implementation of corporate governance in Taiwan, the literature 
regarding to government regulation were purposefully reviewed. 
Review of the Literature 
Introduction to Corporate Governance 
In the early years of 21St century the breakthrough news of corporate debacles 
such as the Enron, Tyco and WorldCom scandals have shocked industries, capital 
markets, and investors around the world. For decades, business failures have never been 
absent the business headlines; however, none were like these. They resulted in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA), as well as the subsequent regulations at the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ stock markets. 
Origin of Corporate Governance 
All of a sudden, corporate governance has caught the world's eyes, in the U.S., 
European countries, and newly developed Asian countries-wherever there are 
corporations and stock markets. Corporate governance relates to a corporation and its 
shareholders, and has re-emerged as one of the most significant business topics of early 
21st century (Banks, 2004). 
Corporate govemance has been commonly recognized as a public policy issue in 
the United States. This idea finds its origin in Berle and Means' classical theory of 
agency problems, summarized by Salacuse (2002) as "how could corporate managers. as 
agents of shareholders, be induced to manage corporate assets in the best interests of their 
principals" (p. 4)? 
Although Berle and Means' agency problem has not changed, institutional 
investors have become more prevalent due to privately funded U.S. retirement systems. 
"Many Europeans consider the traditional American definition of corporate governance, 
with its central preoccupation on protecting shareholder rights and interests, to be too 
narrow" (Salacuse, 2002, p. 475). From the European perspective, therefore, the 
purposes of corporate governance are supposed to be: to take social responsibility, to 
protect shareholders' interests, to promote economic growth, to attract international 
capital, to aid in company growth and sustainability, and to enhance company 
performance (Detomasi, 2002; Salacuse, 2002). 
Corporate Governance Systems 
In 2004, Banks introduced his contemporary theory of corporate governance 
models, based on his qualitative phenomenological studies about different types of 
shareholding structure (concentrated or diffuse), use of various governance mechanisms 
(internal and external), as well as relationship and interest focuses (long-term or 
short-term). The theory generalized three major corporate governance models: the 
market model, the relationship model, and the hybrid model. In addition to governance 
models, Banks classified two different types of boards of directors: the single board 
system and the dual board system (Banks, 2004). This theory is socially significant, 
addressing essential issues in the discipline of corporate governance, and is useful in 
explaining and discriminating among those with different internal and external 
governance characteristics. 
The market model. This model is executed in the U. S., UK, Australia, Canada, 
and several other countries. It features very diffuse shareholdings, liquid capital 
markets, dynamic capital reallocation, advanced legal and regulatory frameworks, and an 
active market for corporate control. At the internal governance level, management's 
power is in excess of the board, they focus on investments that can maximize enterprise 
value and the stock price, particularly over the short run. Shareholders are commonly 
known as the primary stakeholders (Banks, 2004). 
The relationship model. This model is found in Japan, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and France, among others, and is characterized by more concentrated 
ownership stakes and cross-shareholdings, moderately liquid capital markets, less active 
capital reallocation, and less corporate control activity. Regulatory processes are strong; 
although legal frameworks exist, they are often replaced (or at least supplemented) by 
informal negotiation arising from long-term business relationships. At the internal 
governance level, company management is monitored by the board in form. However, 
in practice, it is overseen by main banks, or large company or family shareholders. In 
addition, management is not forced by the stock price to make risky investments for 
maximizing short-term interests of the individual and the company. As a result, 
management seems not to be accountable to the shareholders. Therefore, primary 
stakeholders are practically employees rather than shareholders by law (Banks, 2004). 
The hybrid model. This model is found in various developing nations (such as 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, and Mexico). It combines significant 
characteristics of the relationship model with dimensions of the market model. but still 
has certain unique elements of its own. For example, capital markets are illiquid, the 
market for corporate control is either inactive or nonexistent, and regulatory and legal 
frameworks are often in an early stage. At the internal governance level, interests of 
families, related enterprise conglomerates, banks, and the government as a whole or 
individual officials are interwoven and interdependent on each other. Although some of 
the elements of this model have changed since the late 1990s (such as less linkage with 
conglomerates and political forces), many of the characteristics remain unchanged 
(Banks, 2004). 
The single board system Under a single board system, the board of 
directors-generally nominated on an individual basis through an internal committee 
and/or executive management recommendations, and elected by shareholders-acts as an 
independent monitor of company management. The board, headed by the chairperson, 
typically includes 10 to 20 directors. It is commonly used by companies in countries 
such as the U.S., Canada, the UK, Japan and Korea. In some countries the chairperson 
also serves as CEO and thus performs two distinct functions, managing the board of 
directors and the executive team, a role that has the potential of leading to conflicts of 
interest (Banks, 2004). 
The dual board system The dual board system consists of two bodies: the 
supervisory board and the management board. The supervisory board is roughly 
equivalent to the board of directors, and is headed by a chairperson corresponding to the 
chairperson of the board under the single board system. It is responsible for 
independent oversight of company management. Specifically, the supervisory board, 
acting as agent of the shareholders, is responsible for appointing, supervising and 
advising members of the management board, and developing fundamental corporate 
strategy. The management board is equivalent to the executive management team in 
companies, and is headed by a chairperson corresponding to the CEO in the single board 
system. This system is commonly used by companies in Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands, and certain other continental European countries (Banks, 2004). 
The Prevailing Market Model 
A more detailed but narrow definition of corporate governance employed by 
market practitioners is "Corporate governance is the system of rules and institutions that 
determine the control and direction of the corporation and that define relations among the 
corporation's primary participants-the shareholders, boards of directors, and company 
management" (Salacuse, 2002, p. 473). This definition has been the primary public 
issue related to corporate governance in the U.S. and many other countries with a similar 
governance system, such as the U.K., Canada, and Australia. 
Founded upon this definition, corporate governance in the U.S. strengthens the 
protection of shareholder rights and the maximization of shareholder return. "At a 
micro level . . . management is very focused on investments with measurable returns that 
seek to maximize enterprise value and the stock price, particularly over the short run. 
Shareholders are widely recognized as the primary stakeholders" (Banks, 2004, p. 26). 
Since the financial crises in East Asia (1997-98) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 
American market system of corporate governance has been evolving all over the world. 
For example, "The German Federal Government and the High Level Group of Company 
Law Experts . . . have recently published proposals to foster the development of deep and 
liquid GermanIEuropean capital markets. The proposed regulation shows remarkable 
resemblances to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002" (Heeren & Rickers, 2003, p. 595). In 
addition, "Japanese corporate law is undergoing a transition with new Commercial Code 
amendments in 2003 that allow corporations to opt for an Anglo-American model of 
governance" (Sarra & Nakahigashi, 2002, p. 299). Furthermore and interestingly 
enough, "China is establishing its corporate governance structures by emulating the 
stylized Anglo-American model. However, the country does not yet have the necessary 
formal and informal institutions, or the financial infrastructure to make these structures 
work effectively" (Tam, 2002, p. 303). 
Soederberg (2003) wrote a theoretical paper, explaining how and why corporate 
governance has become standardized, and questions whose interests are being served. 
He concluded that the imposed standardization, by the International Monetary Funds' 
Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), drawing on the 
Anglo-American model, serves two goals: "to stabilize the international financial system 
in a neo-liberal open market economy, and to emphasize shareholder value and protect 
the interests of institutional investors based in market-centric systems such as that of the 
U.S." (Soederberg, 2003, p. 10). 
Trend of Convergence in Global Corporate Governance Systems 
Consider the renewal examples of corporate governance regulation in Germany, 
Japan and China with different governance systems from the American model. Do they 
indicate that there is a trend of convergence in global corporate governance systems? 
Opinions vary, no definite result is apparent. For the present, it may be useful to more 
closely examine some important features of these corporate governance systems. 
According to Detomasi (2002), there are three elements which contribute to 
effective corporate governance: "(I)  a strong public sector's govemance regulations, (2) 
an internal govemance mechanism in individual companies, and (3) well-trained 
independent auditors to perform neutral and objective auditing practices of corporate 
behavior" (Detomasi, 2002, p. 421). 
The three models of corporate governance (the market model, the relationship 
model, and the hybrid model) exist in numerous countries. They vary in terms of capital 
market liquidity, legal framework, and shareholder diffusion. However, not all the 
countries, especially the developing countries, have the same elements of executing 
effective corporate governance (Tam, n.d., p. 303). Even in the developed countries, 
other differences still exist, such as Japan's bank-centered mutual ownership stakes and 
in Germany's labor representatives on the "supervisory" board (Charkham, 1994). 
These corporate governance systems have different strengths and weaknesses. 
Detomasi (2002) reported that Fort and Schipani argued global market competition will 
lead the governance model to the American market model, since it emphasizes corporate 
performance, especially in lowering costs over the long run. Additionally, the flow of 
international capital should force the convergence to the American system. Furthermore, 
"the American system emphasizes innovation, tolerates failure, and fosters 
entrepreneurial activity, but the Geman and Japanese systems are often accused of 
stifling in these" (Detomasi, 2002, p. 431). Nestor and Thompson (2001) have shared 
the same point of view as well. 
Conversely, Detomasi (2002) also reported Roe's argument that German and 
Japanese governance systems have been praised for their strengths in company's 
sustainability and superiority "for long-term planning, as well as their coordinating ability 
to include stakeholder concerns within the decision-making process through structured 
interaction between the CEO and other stakeholders" (Detomasi, 2002, p. 431). 
Moreover, Nye has argued "the American demand for increased quarterly shareholder 
return and the practice of reimbursing board members in stock may encourage financial 
manipulation and cause oversight corruption, both of which featured prominently in the 
fall of Enron" (as cited in Detomasi, 2002, p. 43 1). 
Among these pros and cons, Salacuse (2002), through reviewing some statistical 
studies on the dispersed share-holding issue, explored the link between culture and 
corporate governance to speculate on the possibilities for convergence of corporate 
governance systems in the future. The difference in the concentration of shareholder 
ownership between the U.S., the U.K., and the European continent, is amazing. For 
example, Salacuse (2002) reported a study by Mayer among 1,309 corporations listed on 
the NYSE and 2,83 1 corporations on the NASDAQ found that the median size of block 
holding by an investor group was less than the minimum required disclosure level of 5 
percent. Additionally, Salacuse (2002) reported a U.K. study by Barca and Becht found 
that out of 1,926 listed companies, less than 3% had shareholders with majority control. 
As reported by Salacuse (2002) the study by Mayer indicated, on the other hand, in 50% 
of listed companies in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy, a single investor or related 
group of investors controlled more than 50 percent of voting stock, and that 50 percent of 
listed companies in the Netherlands, France, Spain and Sweden, a single block holder (an 
individual or related group of investors) controlled more than 43.5%, 20%, 34.5%, and 
34% respectively, of voting rights. According to Mayer "share ownership and therefore 
voting power in publicly traded corporations is more concentrated in Europe than it is in 
the United States and the U.K. In addition, a larger percentage of the population is 
shareholders in the U.S. than in European countries . . . the New York Times reported 
that one half of all American adults directly or indirectly own corporate shares, while 
only one in five Gennans is a shareholder" (as cited in Salacuse, 2002, p. 474). 
Salacuse (2002) concluded that corporate governance systems, like a society's 
other important institutions, are not easily replaced due to the cultural differences and 
various value concepts. Consequently, one cannot assume that American values of 
individualism will replace European attachment to community values any time soon. 
"Finally a middle ground, a point of convergence between the pure shareholder model 
advanced by Americans and the extreme stakeholder model advocated by Europeans, 
may reside in the notion of socially responsible corporate governance, which seeks to 
bring together two important themes together: good governance and social responsibility" 
(Salacuse, 2002, p. 476). 
Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness 
Important Issues of Corporate Governance 
The second element leading to effective corporate governance has been depicted 
as strong internal governance practices of companies themselves, performed by a 
community of well-trained managers and executives. Before discussing this subject in 
more detail, the four important Standard & Poors' Rating Criteria related to corporate 
governance are illustrated initially: 
(1) Ownership-transparency of ownership; concentration and influence of 
ownership; 
(2) Financial stakeholder relations-regularity of, ease of, access to, and 
information on shareholder meetings; voting and shareholder meeting 
procedures; ownership rights (registration and transferability, equality or 
ownership right); 
(3) Financial transparency and information disclosure-type of public disclosure 
standards adopted; timing of, and access to, public disclosure; independence and 
standard of auditors; and 
(4) Board and management structure and process-board structure and composition; 
role and effectiveness of board; role and independence of outsider directors; 
board and executive compensation, evaluation and succession policies (Standard 
& Poors, Rating Criteria, 2004, p. 115). 
These issues all interact and weave together to result in governance effectiveness 
and company performance. In this literature review, the fourth criterion regarding board 
and management structure and process is examined closely. First of all, definitions of 
related terms of interest in the topic are described next. 
Board structure. Maassen describes board structure as an element of "board 
organization; the role of subsidiary boards in holding companies; board committees; the 
formal independence of one-tier and two-tier boards; and the leadership of boards and the 
flow of information between board structures" (as cited in Kakabadse, Kakabadse & 
Kouzmin, 2001, p. 2). Usually, a definition of board structure is "seen from the 
perspective of having a separate chair, a majority of outside directors, and an optimal 
size" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 3). 
Board composition. Zahra and Pearce, and Maassen refer to board composition 
in terms of "the size of the board and the mix of different director's demographics 
(insiders/outsiders, malelfemale, foreign/local) and the degree of affiliation directors have 
with the corporations" (as cited in Kakabadse et al., p. 2). 
Board characteristics. According to Hambrick, and Zabra and Pearce's 
definition, "board characteristics encompass director's backgrounds, such as director's 
experience; tenure; functional background; independence; stock ownership and other 
variables that influence director's interests and their performance" (as cited in Kakabadse 
et al., p. 2). Sometimes, these characteristics are called "board demography" (Forbes & 
Miliken, 1999, p. 490), or "board membership" as defined by Leblanc and Gillies (2003), 
which means "how directors come to be recruited onto a board, the balanced 
competencies of existing members, and the methods that are taken to remove a director 
from a board" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 6). 
Board process. Usually, board process is defined as "how directors make 
decisions and the behavior of the individual directors themselves" (Leblanc & Gillies, 
2003). 
Board effectiveness. Board effectiveness can be conceptualized as "a function 
of overall contribution of the board to organization, standard of support provided by the 
board to the organization, individual contribution of directors to the organization, board 
dynamics, board performance evaluation and review" (Ingley & van der Walt, 2003, p. 
2). 
Company performance. Indicators of good company performance are defined 
financially in terms of sales, return on assets (ROA), and market value (Colley, et al., 
2003). These are applicable broadly in the American market model. As indicated by 
Detomasi (2002) and Salacuse (2002), from the European perspective, the purposes of 
corporate governance include addressing interests of political and social constituents. 
Therefore, financial performance measurement is just one of the purposes in the other 
two corporate governance models. To emphasize, in this review, company performance is 
measured by financial indicators only. 
Independent Directors and Board Independence 
Corporate debacles such as the Enron and WorldCom scandals have shocked 
industries, capital markets, and investors around the world. The present crisis of 
investor confidence is due to "a breach of fiduciary duty by the trustees of the investors' 
interests, namely the board of directors and management. A passive, non-independent, 
and rubber-stamping board of directors made up of members selected by the CEO or 
chairman of the board is not a guarantee of effective oversight of management actions 
and conduct" (Colley, et al., 2004, p. 23). Thus, independent directors and board 
independence are continually discussed and considered the most important issues in 
solving corporate governance problems. 
Independent directors are those that "the board of directors affirmatively 
determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company (either 
directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship 
with the company)" (NYSE, 2003, p. 10). Hence, outside directors may not be 
independent; but independent directors must be outsiders. However, in practice, outside 
directors are mostly independent. 
Board independence regulations are ruled by NYSE-pursuant to the SOA of 
2002, and submitted to the Securities Exchange Commission: "Listed companies must 
have a majority of independent directors" (NYSE, 2003, p. 10). An operational 
definition of board independence developed by Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) uses two 
measures in their research: "First is OUTDIR, which is the number of outside unaffiliated 
directors as a percentage of all directors in the board .... the second is RELTENR, is the 
average tenure of outside directors as a ratio of the tenure of the CEO" (p. 34). 
Are independent directors and board independence so important to the 
enhancement of board process and board effectiveness, and thus to the company 
performance? Researchers have developed propositions, and empirically examined their 
relationships for decades among different industries. 
Westphal(1999) conducted a study of board independence and firm performance. 
He used a non-experimental, causal comparative quantitative design, analyzing data by 
least squares multiple regressions analysis to examine the relationships of CEO-board 
social ties, board involvement, and company performance. Westphal's literature review 
was thorough, current and interpretive in comparing and contrasting theories of how 
CEO-board relationships influence board involvement in corporate governance. The 
sample of 600 companies was randomly selected from the Forbes 1,000 index of U.S. 
industrial and service firms. Data collection was implemented using questionnaires. 
Several steps were taken to prevent duplicated replies of the same respondent. Through 
deliberate design ensuring the responses, the author finally had a response rate of 44% 
@=263) for CEOs and 43% (N=564) for directors. Hypotheses were tested using the 
original respondents mentioned (Westphal, 1999). 
Westphal (1999) conducted a pretest using in-depth pilot interviews with 22 top 
managers and board members to strengthen the construct validity of the instrument. 
Multiple response formats were used for reducing response bias, and items for measuring 
each construct were spread throughout the survey. Westphal (1999) examined 
inter-rater reliability by comparing CEO and outside director responses on the monitoring 
and cooperation items, and calculating Kappa coefficients for each item. 
To assess dependent variables of company performance, the Westphal (1999) 
used two measures, return on equity (accounting-based) and market-to-book value 
(market-based). To measure the independent variable of the portion of the board 
appointed after the CEO was appointed, it was calculated "as the number of outside 
directors appointed during a CEO's tenure, divided by the total number of outsiders" 
(p.6). "To assess the level of CEO-board friendship ties, CEOs were asked to consider 
their personal relationships with other board members.. . . the current number of perceived 
friendships was then divided by the total number of outside board members" (Westphal, 
1999, p. 7). 
To assess CEO incentive alignment, two measures were used: First, CEO 
ownership was measured as the number of common shares owned by the CEO, divided 
by the total amount of common stock outstanding. Second, long-term incentive plan 
compensation indicated the extent to which CEO compensation was contingent upon the 
achievement of specific performance goals. It was calculated as the total value of 
long-term incentive grants made in the year prior to the survey date divided by total 
compensation in that year. In addition, several control variables were considered and 
included in the analyses (Westphal, 1999). 
Westphal acknowledges several limitations in the study. First, his research 
focused on advising interactions initiated by CEOs. Nevertheless, board-initiated advice 
giving does occur, and it could become a more significant form of involvement in the 
future. Second, his study did not address the specific content or quality of board advice. 
Finally, he did not investigate how board collaboration and control affected a board's 
ability to perform certain external roles. Therefore, he suggested future study examine 
how CEO-board cooperation and control affect a board's ability to exercise its other 
functions, how different kinds of CEO-board relationships are perceived by internal and 
external stakeholders, and the consequences of these relationships for organizational 
legitimacy. Additionally, this study also suggested new directions for research on 
management incentives (Westphal, 1999). 
Westphal's study shows ';how and when a lack of social independence (active 
social ties of board members and top management) can increase board involvement and 
firm performance by raising the frequency of advice and counsel interactions between the 
CEO and outside directors" (p. 7). Additionally, Westphal's study explains how CEOs 
and outside directors collaborate in the strategic decision making process, and 
demonstrates that such collaboration independently and positively contributes to firm 
performance. Furthermore, the findings suggest that future research should examine 
how CEO-board cooperation and control affect a board's ability to exercise its other 
major functions, including its role in managing resource dependence and in enhancing 
organizational legitimacy. The findings may also suggest new directions for research on 
management incentives based on the confirmed interactions between incentive alignment 
and social ties (Westphal, 1999). 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) conducted secondary analyses and correlational 
designs of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to examine the relationship between 
board independence and company performance. They used two separate models (a 
single equation approach and a simultaneous equation system) to examine how board 
independence, CEO characteristics and ownership structure influence performance. The 
data were collected from the 1999 Proxy statements and the SNL Database for traded 
equity REITs. They adopted two proxies, OUTDIR and RELTENR, to measure board 
independence, and using a simultaneous equations method to analyze the collected data 
(Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003). 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) concluded that greater representation by outside 
directors on REIT boards enhances performance, although the relationship is weak. 
Their research contributes first by attempting "to explore the determinants of board 
structure in the REIT world. Second, it develops a comprehensive model to examine the 
impact of board structure on company performance" (Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003, p.17). 
Specifically, researchers adjusted "for several control variables including the size of the 
firm and market-to-book ratio, in order to control their intervening influence on the 
outcome variable of company performance" (Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003, p.17). 
Bhagat and Black (2002) found a reasonably strong inverse relationship between 
company performance and board independence, indicating no evidence that greater board 
independence leads to improved firm performance. The study was a large-sample, 
longitudinal empirical study of whether the degree of board independence correlates with 
various measures of the long-term performance of large American firms. The study was 
comprehensive in terms of methodology used, such as their sampling plan (data on board 
composition were from a database of 957 large U.S. public corporations; data of the 
sample firms' financial performance were from Compustat), analysis (ordinary least 
squares and simultaneous equations methods), tests for entry and exit bias, performance 
variables, and control variables (Bhagat & Black, 2002). 
The most valuable conclusions reported by Bhagat and Black were five possible 
theoretical explanations as to why the traditional wisdom favors highly independent 
boards was not supported. (1)  Independent directors need more incentives. (2) Today's 
independent directors aren't independent enough. (3) Some directors are beholden to the 
company or its current CEO in ways too subtle to be captured in customary definitions of 
independence. (4) Some types of independent directors may be valuable, while others are 
not. (5) Independent directors can add value, but only if they are embedded in an 
appropriate committee structure (Bhagat & Black, 2002, p. 260). 
Impact of Board Structure and Board Process on Board Effectiveness 
Leblanc and Gillies (2003) reported several empirical studies in their review of 
the literature, and concluded that the evidence from these studies indicates that 
independence is not a major factor in corporate performance. They conducted a 
qualitative study of director independence and company performance through 
interviewing 200 directors on 21 boards and committees. Although the full methodology 
was not presented in the article, the 194 subjects interviewed included regulators, 
shareholders (both institutional and retail) and corporate directors (who constitute the 
majority of respondents). The findings were that a vast majority of respondents were 
"ovenvhelmingly of the view that a relationship does exist between corporate governance 
and the financial success of the corporation. In other words, the directors interviewed 
believe that better boards make for better companies. Yet researchers, at least with 
respect to board structure, have not been able to prove this" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 
1 ). 
Based on this study, Leblanc and Gillies developed "the board effectiveness" 
rather than "the board structure" approach to corporate governance reform. They 
claimed "The fact is that in spite of all the discussion, writing and analysis, there has not 
been a great deal of research on how boards actually work, how they make decisions, or 
on how directors interact with each other" (Leblanc & Gilles, 2003, p. 5 ) .  As a result, 
they developed a new schematic model of board effectiveness (Leblanc & Gilles, 2003). 
In the model, "it is board effectiveness, not board structure that must be analyzed, 
for it is the effectiveness of the board in the decision-making process that finally 
determines corporate performance" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 6). Furthermore, Leblanc 
and Gilles explain that "an effective board must be built on a foundation of members who 
are independent" @. 6). Additionally, "it must be made up of members with the 
competencies required by the corporation to fulfill its strategies and to meet its 
obligations, and the members must be able to work together to come to effective 
decisions" (p. 6). Leblanc and Gillies (2003) refer to these three dimensions as "the 
right board structure . . ., the right board membership . . ., and the right board process" (p. 
6). Their schematic and interactive relationships are shown in Figure 1. 
Board Effectiveness 
- 
(nis model is based on a swdy of twenry-one boards and committees in action and 
interviews with almost 200 directors. For a full discussion ofthe methodology used 
in the study, please see R. Lebianc's J.Giiiies' forrhcoming book.) 
Figure 1. Board effectiveness model by Richard Leblanc and James Gillies. 
From "The Coming Revolution in Corporate Governance." by Richard Leblanc and James Gillies. Reprint # 9B03TE03, lvey Business 
Journal, SeptemberIOctober 2003, p. 9. Copyright 2003 by h e y  Management Services Inc. Reprinted with permission. (See 
Appendix B). 
Leblanc and Gillies (2003) define board membership as "how directors come to 
be recruited onto a board, the balanced competencies of existing members, and the 
methods that are taken to remove a director from a board (e.g., director tenure or 
retirement) (p. 6). According to Leblanc and Gillies, board process is defined as "how 
directors make decisions and the behavior of the individual directors themselves" (p.7). 
Their interactions based on the behavioral characteristics are the most important factor in 
the board process. Finally, Leblanc and Gillies conclude that "the missing link in 
establishing the relationships between board structure, board membership and corporate 
performance may be an understanding of the activity called board process" (Leblanc & 
Gillies, 2003, p. 7). 
Leblanc and Gillies (2003) examined Westphal's (1999) empirical studies and 
conclusion, which led to the new model of board effectiveness that emphasizes its 
influence on company performance rather than director independence. This theory is 
socially significant, addressing essential issues about corporate governance in practice, 
and is useful in closing the gap of director independence and company performance. 
Effective Board Process and Goals of Board Process 
Criteria of Board Effectiveness and a Model of Board Processes 
Leblanc and Gillies' (2003) view of the board process as "group interacting 
behavior" (p.6) corresponds to the views of Forbes and Milliken (1999), who developed 
"a model of board processes by integrating the literature on boards of directors with the 
literature on group dynamics and workgroup effectiveness" (p. 489). Drawing on 
theories about small-group decision-making, Forbes and Milliken developed a schematic 
model about three critical board processes and two board-level outcomes that are viewed 
as mediators of the relationships between commonly studied aspects of board 
demography and company performance. The model is concerned with two criteria of 
board effectiveness: "(1) board task performance, defined as the board's ability to 
perform its control and service tasks effectively, and (2) the board's ability to continue 
working together, as evidenced by the cohesiveness of the board" (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999, p. 492). Furthermore, Forbes and Milliken proposed three board processes with 
significant influence on a board's task performance and cohesiveness: effort norms, 
cognitive conflicts, and the board's use of its knowledge and skills. 
In the Forbes and Milliken model, board task performance represents the degree 
to which boards succeed in fulfilling their control and service tasks. Specific board 
activities of the control task include decisions regarding the hiring, compensation, and 
replacement of the firm's top management, as well as the approval of major initiatives 
proposed by management. Specific activities of the service task include providing 
expertise and detailed insight for strategic planning, such as a merger & acquisition, or 
restructuring (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). "Board cohesiveness refers to the degree to 
which board members are attracted to each other and are motivated to stay on the board 
( p  494). 
Forbes and Milliken's model of board processes was based on their qualitative, 
phenomenological studies about small group decision-making. This theory identifies 
three major constructs+ffort norms, cognitive conflicts, and the board's use of its 
knowledge-which will significantly influence a board's task performance and 
cohesiveness. This theory is socially significant, addressing essential issues about board 
effectiveness in the discipline of corporate governance, and is useful in explaining, 
predicting, and discriminating among those with board task performance and 
cohesiveness or not. Thus it is a well-developed guide to board effectiveness and 
corporate governance. Theoretically, this model of board processes enforces and 
complements the missing link between corporate governance and company performance 
noted by Leblanc and Gillies (2003). 
In addition, Forbes and Milliken (1999) characterized knowledge and skills on 
two main dimensions: (1) business management functional knowledge and skills, and (2) 
firm-specific knowledge and skills. In case of the presence of these capabilities, boards 
still need the cohesiveness to share and use them. In concluding their observations 
regarding the effects of board processes, Forbes and Milliken (1999) provide four 
propositions to guide future scholarly research. 
Proposition 1 : Board effort norms, cognitive conflict, and the use of knowledge 
and skills will be positively related to board task performance. 
Proposition 2: Cognitive conflict will be negatively related to board 
cohesiveness. 
Proposition 3a: Board cohesiveness will be related in a curvilinear manner to 
board task performance. 
Proposition 3b: The relationship between cohesiveness and board task 
performance will be moderated by cognitive conflict-that is, 
cohesiveness will be less likely to detract from board task 
performance when the board has a high level of cognitive 
conflict. , 
Proposition 4: The degree ofjob-related diversity ori the board will be 
positively related to the presence of functional area knowledge 
and skills and cognitively related to the board's cohesiveness 
and its use of its knowledge and skills. (p. 497-499) 
Goals of Board Process 
In order to demonstrate the effect of the "usual suspects" (positive relationship 
between board composition and company performance) approach to corporate 
governance, Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) conducted two descriptive statistical tests in 
their study of board independence and company performance. Although no significant 
differences were found in Finkelstein and Mooney's study about the "usual suspects" 
between high and low performers, they still presented their results, through 32 structured 
interviews with members of corporate boards, on how to actually make the board work 
better. The focus was on the board process. In addition to Forbes and Milliken's' 
theoretical model, they concluded that "board effectiveness requires five interrelated 
process goals to be realized: (I)  Engage in constructive conflict; (2) Avoid destructive 
conflict; (3) Work together as a team; (4) Know the appropriate level of strategic 
involvement; and (5) Address decisions comprehensively (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003, 
p. 106). Based on the statistical findings and their interviews with board directors, 
Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) suggested an action plan and considered that these 
recommendations will be helpfhl in advancing more than one process goal, and, in some 
cases, addressed all five goals. 
Corporate Governance in Taiwan 
According to Banks' (2004) classification, Taiwan's corporate governance system 
can be attributed to the hybrid model, which is found in various developing nations, and 
contains significant elements of the relationship model, but also includes dimensions of 
the market model and certain unique characteristics of its own. Regarding the structure 
of board of directors, there must be two supervisors at least who can oversee the company 
independently in addition to directors (Company Act, 2006, Chapter V, Section 4 & 5). 
However, in the Securities and Exchange Act (2006), the setting of supervisors can be 
replaced by establishing an audit committee constituted by directors that direct the 
Taiwan's operations of the board toward the market model of the United States. 
Corporate Governance System of Taiwan 
The basic legal framework in Taiwan to implement corporate governance includes 
three components (TSEC, 2006): 
1. Company law is the regulatory foundation of corporate governance. The roles of 
shareholders' meeting, board of directors and supervisors regulated in the Company 
Act were designed to achieve the objective of corporate governance through checks 
and balances. 
2. The administration and supervision of the offering, issuance, and trading of securities 
issued by a public company are governed by the Securities and Exchange Act. 
3. The listing regulations set forth by TSEC and GTSM together with the Company Act, 
Securities and Exchange Act, and other ordinances for public companies can help and 
guide listed companies in the establishment, implementation and practice of corporate 
governance system. 
The independent director and supervisor system is a significant part of corporate 
governance in Taiwan. As regulated by Taiwan's Company Act, a public limited 
company is required to have a board of directors with 3 directors at least, and 2 
supervisors at least (Company Act, 2006, Chapter V, Section 4). The listing regulations 
stipulate that a company applying for listing the first time must have no less than five 
directors, and set aside certain seats for an independent director and a supervisor (Taiwan 
Securities and Exchange Act, 2006, Article 26-3). Those provisions also specify the 
qualifications and independent status of such directors and supervisors. Until the 
enactment of the amended "Securities and Exchange Act" in 2006, all the listed 
companies are required to appoint independent directors not less than two in number and 
not less than one-fifth of the total number of directors (Taiwan Securities and Exchange 
Act, 2006, Article 14-2). Additionally, a listed company shall establish either an audit 
committee or a supervisor (Taiwan Securities and Exchange Act, 2006, Article 14-4). 
Reforms of Taiwan's Corporate Governance 
Since Berle and Means in 1932, the American academic community has been 
exploring the issues of corporate governance. The topic caught on with Asian countries 
in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis. In order to reform Taiwan's corporate 
governance system through integrated planning and gradual movement, the Securities 
and Futures Commission (which has become Securities and Futures Bureau since July 1, 
2004) has launched "The Project for Planning, Promotion, and Implementation of 
Corporate Governance System in Taiwan. In July 2003, "The Group for Implementing 
Corporate Governance (the "Group")", comprised of representatives from the Taiwan 
Securities Exchange Corporation ("TSEC"), the GreTai Security Market ("GTSM), the 
Securities & Futures Institute ("SFI"), other compliance authorities, industries concerned, 
and academic institutions, were organized to propose various plans aiming at establishing 
a corporate governance system consistent with international trends and domestic needs. 
As a result, seven aims and 27 action items have been implemented. Among them, the 
aims of "Assistance to Enterprises on Establishment of their Corporate Governance 
Culture and System" and "Improvement of Board of Directors' Professional Capability 
on Business Operation", and the actions of "Research and Proposal of Independent 
Directors and Independent Supervisors Election System", "Review of Qualification and 
Independence for Independent Directors and Supervisors", and "Research and 
Promulgation of Guidelines for Promotion of Advanced Studies by Directors, 
Supervisors of TSECIGTSM Listed Companies" are especially significant (TSEC, 2006). 
Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TSECIGTSM Listed Companies 
(CGBPP) 
Referring to comments and suggestions from all relevant government agencies 
and the private sectors, the Group reviewed the proposed "Corporate Governance 
Best-Practice Principles for TSECIGTSM Listed Companies" (CGBPP), and 
promulgated its amended version through the year 2003. Additionally, the Group 
announced on February 16, 2003 reference samples including the rules governing board 
meetings. In sum, the purpose of promulgating CGBPP is to assist TSECIGTSM listed 
companies to establish a sound corporate governance system, and to promote the integrity 
of the securities market. Accordingly, there are five principles a TSECIGTSM listed 
company shall follow: 
1. Protect shareholders' rights and interests; 
2. Strengthen the powers of the board of directors; 
3. Fulfill the function of supervisors; 
4. Respect stakeholders' rights and interests; 
5. Enhance information transparency. (CGBPP, 2002, Article 2) 
Thereafter, in CGBPP, Chapter I11 "Enhancing the Function of Board of 
Directors", the structure of the board of directors, the independent directors , audit 
committee and other functional committees, rules for the proceedings of board meetings 
and the decision-making procedures, and fiduciary duty, duty of care and responsibility 
of directors are recommended for inclusion in the company's corporate governance 
system. 
Summary 
In the literature review, a comprehensive understanding of the origin of corporate 
governance, the exploration of various corporate governance systems in the world, the 
important issues of corporate governance system, and the relationship between 
independent directors, board effectiveness, and company performance, is profiled through 
the existing theoretical studies. Empirically, most of the studies concerning independent 
directors and board independence are not found to be significantly and positively related 
to company performance. However, research of variables such as directors' training, 
board process, board task performance, board cohesiveness, and board effectiveness are 
valuable for developing an effective board process to benefit the governance 
effectiveness and company performance. Particularly, the model of board effectiveness 
and the theory of board processes, which are integrated and synthesized with the studies 
of group decision-making will definitely expand the research dimensions of corporate 
governance to human behavioral science (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). 
Moreover, in order to explore the independent director mechanism already 
implemented in Taiwan's corporate governance system, the related literature and 
governmental regulations, such as TSEC's "CG Report", CGBPP, Taiwan's Company 
Act, and Securities and Exchange Act, are reviewed comprehensively as well. For 
future studies, many subjects in corporate governance practices like the information 
disclosure, board structure, board characteristics, board meeting, board effectiveness and 
company performance are all significant. First of all, independent directors and 
company performance and board training in TSEC listed companies were selected for this 
study. 
Theoretical Framework 
The major theories that guided this study consisted of theories of corporate 
governance, independent director and company performance. The theoretical literature 
began with the concept of corporate governance encompassing independent directors, 
board effectiveness, board structure, board process, directors' characteristics, and 
company performance (Detomasi, 2002; Banks, 2004; NYSE, 2002; NASDAQ, 2002; 
Standard & Poors, Rating Criteria, 2004). Next, the theoretical literature explored the 
relationship among these variables (Anonymous, 2006; Leblanc & Gillies, 2003; 
Westphal, 1999; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Bhagat and Black, 2002). Finally, the 
theoretical literature reviewed the reform of corporate governance in Taiwan 
encompassing the implementation of governance laws and regulations of the listed 
companies, such as independent director and board training (TSEC, 2006). A schematic 
model (Figure 2) depicts the relationships among the major theories and variables in this 
study. 
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Figure 2. Hypothesized model of the relationships between board characteristics and 
company performance, tested in this study. 
The proposition that director independence is beneficial to corporate governance 
and company performance has become conventional wisdom (Anonymous, 2006). The 
investors and regulators not only in the U.S. but also in the other countries with different 
corporate governance systems embrace the belief to reform corporate governance. 
Taiwan's corporate governance has been under such reform during the past few years 
since an independent director was required in the listing rules in 2002. In the same year, 
in order to strengthen director competencies and behaviors for better board effectiveness, 
board members were advised by the listing regulations to take certified advanced training 
courses in management functional and firm-specific field (CGBPP, 2002). Thus, board 
training is also regarded as related to corporate governance and company performance, 
which is examined as well as independent director in this study. 
Research Question 
1. Are there significant differences in financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of 
TSEC listed electronic companies according to the presence or absence of 
independent directors? 
Hypotheses 
1. There are significant differences in the financial performance (ROA, ROE, EPS) of 
TSEC listed electronic companies according to the number of independent directors 
as follows: three independent directors > two independent directors > one 
independent director > 0 independent director. 
2. The number of director training hours significantly explains financial performance of 
TSEC listed electronic companies. 
3. The number of independent directors and the number of board training hours are 
significant explanatory variables of financial performance (ROA, ROE, EPS) of 
TSEC listed electronic companies. 
Chapter I1 presented a literature review of key concepts in this study. The main 
gap is that empirical literature is scant comparing the effect of the number of independent 
director on company performance of TSEC listed electronic companies since the 
regulation of independent director was inaugurated in 2002. The highest number of 
independent directors for all of the TSEC listed companies is four in January 2006, and 
only one company has four independent directors (TSEC, 2006). Thus, it is significant 
to compare the four levels of independent directors (0, 1, 2, and 3). Moreover, there is 
no empirical literature examining the effect of the number of board training hours on 
company performance since board members were advised to take advanced training, and 
their certified numbers of training hours were required to be disclosed on the TSEC 
website publicly. The theoretical framework focusing on independent director, board 
training, and company performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS, provides a 
synthesizing conceptual organization for this study. Chapter I11 presents the 
methodology used to answer the research question and test the hypotheses. 
CHAPTER 111 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 111 presents a description of the methodology used in this exploratory 
(comparative) and correlational (explanatory) study about the relationship between 
number of independent directors and board training hours and company performance in 
terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS. The research question and hypotheses, which appear at 
the end of Chapter 11, evolve from gaps in the literature that need to be examined. 
Chapter I11 begins with a discussion of the research design. The sampling plan, 
instruments, procedures and data collection methods, evaluation of ethical aspects of the 
study, and methods of data analyses are presented. This chapter concludes with an 
evaluation of the research methods used in this study. 
Research Design 
The research design used in this study was a non-experimental, quantitative, 
causal-comparative (exploratory), and correlational (explanatory) design using secondary 
analysis of data. The secondary data of the number of independent directors, board 
training hours, and company performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS were obtained 
from the TSEC official website and publicly disclosed information of listed companies 
reported to TSEC.   he design examined the effect of the presence or absence of 
independent directors on company performance, and the explanatory relationships 
between the number of board training hours and the number of independent directors on 
company financial performance. 
Based on the literature review, although numerous quantitative studies have 
examined the relationships between independent directors and company performance 
(Westphal, 1999; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003; Bhagat & Black, 2002; Chen, Elder & Hsieh, 
2005), none of studies clearly examined independent directors emphasizing comparisons 
and relationships between number of independent directors since the regulation was 
enacted in 2002 in Taiwan. Since there is only one listed company which has four 
independent directors for the board of directors in Taiwan and none have more than four, 
it is significant to compare financial performances of those companies having one, two, 
or three independent directors respectively. Furthermore, no study was found to 
examine the relationship between the number of board training hours and company 
performance, although board members' training of listed companies was advised by 
TSEC in 2002, and the number of board members' certified training hours were required 
to be reported to the same authority. 
The dependent variable in this study was company performance, defined by 
ROA, ROE, and EPS. These three indicators have been commonly used to measure a 
company's financial performance academically and practically. All of the listed 
companies must follow the listing regulation to disclose certified financial reports 
including these figures quarterly, semi-annually, and annually for financial transparency 
(Taiwan Securities and Exchange Act, 2006, Article 36). 
The independent variable of the Research Question was the presence or absence 
of independent directors (0 or more than 1). The independent variable in Hypothesis 1 
was independent directors in the boardroom measured by group. There were four 
groups compared (0, 1 ,2,  and 3) for the TSEC listed companies. One company had four 
independent directors in the boardroom and was excluded from this study. 
Hypothesis 2 included one independent variable (board training hours) and the 
dependent variable of company performance. Board training was measured by the 
number of completed training hours for all board members of a company, which is 
updated and reported to TSEC once a month. Company performance was measured by 
the company's three financial indicators (ROA, ROE, and EPS). Hypothesis 3 included 
two independent variables, the number of independent directors (0, 1, 2, and 3), and the 
number of board training hours and the dependent variable of company performance 
measured by three financial indicators (ROA, ROE, and EPS). 
In this study, the causal-comparative (exploratory) design aimed to examine the 
differences between independent variables and dependent variables for the research 
question and Hypothesis 1. A two-group comparison using three separate independent 
t-tests was used to compare three financial performance indicators (ROA, ROE, and EPS) 
according to the presence or absence of independent directors (the TSEC listed electronic 
companies having none, or one or more independent directors). A four-group 
comparison using three separate ANOVAs with post hoc comparisons was used to 
compare company financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) according to four groups 
(companies having 0, 1,2, or 3 independent directors). 
For Hypotheses 2 and 3, the correlational (explanatory) design used the value of 
one or two independent variables to explain variation in the value of three separate 
measures of the dependent variable (financial performance indicators of ROA, ROE, and 
EPS). For hypothesis 2, three separate simple regression analyses examined the 
explanatory relationship between the number of director training hours (independent 
variable) and each of the ROA, ROE, and EPS financial performance indicators 
(dependent variable). For hypothesis 3, three separate multiple regression analyses 
examined the explanatory relationship between two independent variables (the number of 
director training hours and the number of board of directors) and three separate measures 
of the dependent variable (company financial performance of ROA, ROE, and EPS). 
Population and Sampling Plan 
Target Population 
According to Gay and Airasian (2000), the population that the researcher would 
ideally like to generalize is referred to as the target population. In this study, the target 
population was the electronic public companies currently listed on Taiwan Stock 
Exchange Corporation (TSEC). As of August 9, 2006, there were 304 electronic 
companies listed on TSEC (TSEC, 2006). 
Accessible Population 
The population that the researcher can realistically select from is referred to as the 
accessible, or available, or study population (Babbie, 2004; Gay & Airasian, 2000). As 
of August 9, 2006, all of the 304 listed electronic companies were accessible for this 
study, their company profiles and information regarding corporate governance are 
disclosed and updated every month on the TSEC website. Therefore, the accessible 
population was the same as the target population. 
To answer the question and examine the hypotheses, 304 public electronic 
companies listed on the TSEC as of August 9, 2006 were selected as the sample to 
examine the number of independent directors, the number of board training hours, and 
company performance in terms of ROA, ROE and EPS. They were posted on the TSEC 
website in the corporate governance and financial reports sections respectively. 
Sampling Plan 
The entire target population of TSEC electronic companies constituted the final 
data producing sample for secondary data analysis of independent directors, board 
training, and company performance. No sampling plan was designed. 
Eligibility Criteria 
All companies were included in the sample of the research if they met all of the 
following criteria: 
1. Must be a listed electronic company on TSEC as of August 9, 2006 that discloses its 
financial annual reports for the year of 2005 for testing the question and hypotheses. 
2. Must be a listed electronic company on TSEC as of August 9, 2006 that reported and 
posted its number of independent directors and its number of board members' training 
hours on the TSEC website as of the end of 2005. 
Exclusion Criteria 
1. The only company in the sample having 4 independent directors in the boardroom 
was excluded from analysis. 
2. As of August 9, 2006, 15 companies in the sample that did not disclose financial 
performance indicators for the year of 2005 were excluded. 
Data Producing Sample 
Of the 304 public electronic companies listed on the TSEC as of August 9, 2006, 
16 companies were excluded from analysis. This resulted in a final data producing 
sample of 288 companies (See Appendix A). 
Instrumentation 
The information on the official TSEC website regarding the number of 
independent directors discloses only companies having at least one independent director. 
Those companies having no independent director are not on the list. Therefore, the 
research question can be examined by comparing two groups (absence or presence of 
independent directors). To test Hypothesis 1 and 3, the secondary data on the official 
TSEC website in January 2006 regarding the number of independent directors (0, 1 ,2,  or 
3) of listed electronic companies was selected and analyzed to measure the differences in 
financial performance according to the number of independent directors. To test 
Hypothesis 2 and 3, the secondary data of TSEC regarding the certified training hours of 
board members as at the end of 2005 were selected and analyzed. In addition, the 
secondary data of ROA, ROE, and EPS from the same data source of TSEC, which links 
to the listed companies' financial reports for the year of 2005, were selected as the 
measures. They are updated every month, and can be regarded as one of the most reliable 
public sources accessible. 
The Taiwan Stock Exchange Company (TSEC) provides a Market Observation 
Post System (M.O.P.S.) which discloses listed companies' public information for stock 
investors and stakeholders. In the Corporate Governance section of M.O.P.S., the 
number of independent directors and board members' training hours as of the end of 2005, 
since 2002 when the regulation implemented, can be searched. The financial reports of 
listed companies can be searched through linking the individual company's website. 
Company code, company name, absence or presence of independent directors (EXIND), 
number of independent directors (NOIND), board members' training hours (BTHS), 
ROA, ROE, and EPS of the individual listed electronic company were collected and 
listed in Appendix A as the data for analysis. 
Number of Independent Directors (Independent Variable) 
All of the listed companies are required to appoint independent directors not less 
than two in number and not less than one-fifth of the total number of directors effective 
from the beginning of 2007 (Taiwan Securities and Exchange Act, 2006, Article 14-2). 
Nevertheless, the highest number of independent directors for all the listed companies 
was four as of the end of 2005. Moreover, only one company had four independent 
directors. The only company with four independent directors was excluded from the 
sample group. All the other listed companies appointing independent directors had less 
than 4 in number (0, 1, 2, or 3). Therefore, in this study, the number of independent 
directors was selected to measure the independent variable. 
To examine the Research Question, all of the TSEC electronic companies were 
analyzed by two groups (absence or presence of independent directors). To test 
Hypothesis 1, the number of independent directors (0, 1, 2, or 3) was selected to compare 
variances in company performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS. To test 
Hypothesis 3, the number of independent directors (0, 1, 2, or 3) was selected to examine 
the explanatory relationship between the number of independent directors, board training 
hours, and company performance (ROA, ROE, EPS). 
All of the listed companies are required to report their information regarding the 
number of independent directors to TSEC, and then post on the website. The 
information is oversight by the government and the shareholders; therefore, the reliability 
and validity of the data exist and have been commonly used to conduct research of 
corporate governance issues in Taiwan (Chen, Elder & Hsieh, 2005). 
Board Training Hours (Independent Variable) 
Board members of listed TSEC companies are advised by CGBP regulations to 
"participate in training courses of finance, business, commerce, accounting or law, which 
cover subjects relating to corporate governance upon becoming directors and throughout 
their terms of occupancy" (CGBPP, 2002, Article 40 & 51). Hence, board training 
should be related to corporate governance, board effectiveness, and company 
performance. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 and 3 were formed to examine the explanatory 
relationship between board training hours and company performance. 
To measure board training, all of the board members' training hours taken 
through certified training institutions and reported to TSEC, were used in this study. On 
M.O.P.S. of TSEC, board members' training hours are disclosed, posted, and updated 
when board members take the certified training courses regarding corporate governance. 
According to TSEC Regulation Governing Information Reporting by Listed Companies 
(2005), the listed company is required to report the board members' information of any 
changes including continuing education record by the 15th day of each month for the 
preceding month. The information has oversight by investors, shareholders, and 
supervising officials. 
Company Financial Performance (Dependent Variable) 
In this study, to measure the dependent variable of company performance for the 
Research Question and Hypotheses 1 and 2, return on total assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), and Earnings Per Share (EPS) were selected. These measures have been 
commonly used in academic or market practice as well (Westphal, 1999; Ghosh & 
Simmons, 2003). 
ROA = Net Income + Interest Expense (net of tax) I Average Total Assets 
ROE = Net Income I Average Stockholders' Equity 
EPS = (Net Income - Preferred Dividends) 1 Weighted Average Number of Common 
Shares Outstanding 
According to TSEC Regulation Governing Information Reporting by Listed 
Companies (2005), the listed company is required to report its audit or review report 
prepared by the certified public accountant (CPA), and name of the CPA. The deadline 
for annual data is four months from the close of each fiscal year. Therefore, the 
reliability and validity of the CPA audited data of ROA, ROE, and EPS on the listed 
company's annual report do exist. 
Procedures: Data Collection Methods and Ethical Considerations 
1. In this study, the secondary data were collected from the official TSEC website, 
which is publicly disclosed. The number of independent directors and board 
members' training hours of listed electronic companies as of the end of 2005 was 
searched in the Corporate Governance section of M.O.P.S. on the TSEC website. 
2. ROA, ROE, and EPS of listed electronic companies for the year of 2005 can also be 
searched in the Financial Reports section on the TSEC website which links to the 
annual financial report of the individual companies. 
3. Being an official public website source, the TSEC database is available for all and 
free to use. 
4. Upon approval of Lynn University's IRB, the data collection process was initiated. 
(See Appendix C). 
5. Permission Letter to reprint the Board Effectiveness Model by Richard Leblanc and 
James Gillies (Figure 1 of this dissertation) is listed in Appendix B. 
Methods of Data Analysis 
The data collected from secondary sources was analyzed by using SPSS for 
Windows version 11.0 to test the Research Question and Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. For 
the Research Question, to determine if there is a significant difference in financial 
performance that the absence or presence of the independent directors in a listed 
company really affects their financial performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS, 
three independent-sample t-tests were used for analysis. For Hypothesis 1, to determine 
if any of four different groups of companies with 0, 1, 2, or 3 independent directors 
differs significantly from each other on the financial performance in terms of ROA, ROE, 
and EPS, three separate ANOVAs with post hoc comparisons were used for analysis. 
For Hypothesis 2, to examine if the number of board training hours significantly explains 
financial performance of the TSEC listed electronic companies, three simple regression 
analyses were used for analysis. For Hypothesis 3, to examine if there is explanatory 
relationship between the number of independent directors and the number of board 
training hours, and company performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS), three separate multiple 
regression analyses were used. 
Evaluation of Research Methods 
This was a non-experimental study. This study was examined for internal and 
external validity by addressing the strengths and weaknesses of research methods. 
Strengths of this study's design are addressed systematically as follows: 
1. A quantitative research method in this study is a strength because the official 
secondary data can be used to examine the question and test hypotheses in a 
less-studied area, the effect of the absence or presence of independent directors and 
the training of boards of directors on company performance. 
2. Through consulting various academic and practical experts including Professor T. C. 
Yang of National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan, Professor C. H. Tsao of Leader 
University, and Miss Elaine Lin, Secretary General of Corporate Governance 
Association, the secondary data from the official TSEC is one of the more reliable 
and commonly used sources to collect the data needed for examining corporate 
governance related issues. 
3. Due to the accessibility of secondary data on the TSEC website and the individual 
company's website, the entire target population could be used as the unit of analysis, 
limiting sampling bias, and strengthening external validity. 
4. A causal-comparative design involving two independent groups (listed electronic 
companies appointing the independent director, or not) and one dependent variable of 
company financial performance (with three financial performance indicators), was 
appropriate to answer the Question using the independent-sample t-test method. 
5. Causal-comparative study involving four independent groups (listed electronic 
companies having 0, 1, 2, or 3 independent directors) and one dependent variable of 
company financial performance (with three financial performance indicators), was 
appropriate for testing Hypothesis 1 using the one-way ANOVA method. 
6. Explanatory correlational study using multiple regression analysis to examine the 
relationship between two independent variables and three dependent variables was 
appropriate for testing Hypothesis 3. 
7. Content validity was established because ROE, ROA and EPS are commonly 
implemented for measuring company performance academically and practically. 
8. Because the disclosure of independent directors, board members' training and 
financial transparency are required by government regulations and reviewed by 
various stakeholders such as monitoring authorities, investors and stock market 
researchers, the reliability and validity of data on the official website and CPA 
audited financial report do exist. 
Weaknesses of this study's design are addressed systematically as follows: 
1. More context variables should be examined to show the influence of these variables 
with the number of independent directors, directors' training programs, and on 
company financial performance. 
2. Although the independent director's appointment in the boardroom has been required 
by the regulation since 2002, for the initial implementation period until the end of 
2006, it is not enforced but advised only. Some companies may perform very well 
financially, but they may not appoint independent directors. 
Chapter 111 presented the research methodology related to the research question 
and hypotheses concerning the absence or presence of the number of independent 
directors, board training hours, and company performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and 
EPS for TSEC electronic companies. This chapter included a description of the research 
design, the sampling plan, instrumentation, data collection procedures, and methods of 
data analysis. Chapter IV presents the results of this study. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The results of this study concerning independent directors and company 
performance, and board training in TSEC electronic companies are presented in Chapter 
IV. To answer the research question and test the hypotheses, methods of data analyses 
included descriptive and inferential statistics, consisting of independent t tests, ANOVA 
with post hoc comparisons, simple regression, and multiple regression analyses. 
Research Question 
Are there significant differences in financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) 
of TSEC listed electronic companies according to the presence or absence of independent 
directors? 
Independent Director's Appointment and Company Performance: 
Independent Sample t Test 
In this study, to examine and answer the research question, three separate 
independent sample t tests were used to compare the means of ROA, ROE, and EPS 
according to the absence or presence of the independent directors of TSEC listed 
electronic companies. Due to the exclusion criteria, 288 companies were examined out 
of the 304 accessible companies. The 288 companies were separated into two groups 
according to the absence or presence of independent directors. As shown in Table 1, the 
analyses of the independent samples t-tests indicated that the 122 companies with the 
absence of independent directors had a mean of 2.4 for ROA, of 1.0 for ROE, and of 1.2 
for EPS. The 166 companies with the presence of one and more independent directors 
had a mean of 8.1 for ROA, of 11.8 for ROE, and of 2.7 for EPS respectively. 
Additionally, the t-tests revealed that the presence of independent directors for TSEC 
listed electronic companies resulted in significantly higher financial performance than 
companies without independent directors for ROA (1 = -4.02, p = ,000). ROE (1 = -3.22, 
p = .002), and EPS ( t  = -3.24, p = ,001). Levene's test for equality of variances 
indicated variances for the two groups of ROE differed significantly from each other 
(.004). Therefore, it would be necessary to use the unequal variance result of the t-test. 
Table I 
Numbers, Means, and Independent t, and p of Absence or Presence of Independent 
Directors by ROA, ROE, and EPS 
Absence or Presence of Independent 
Directors N Mean t P 
ROA Absence of independent directors 122 2.4 
-4.02 .OOO 
Presence of one, or more than one 166 8.1 independent directors 
ROE Absence of independent directors 122 1 .O 
-3.22a .002 
Presence of one, or more than one 166 11.1 independent directors 
EPS Absence of independent directors 122 1.2 
-3.24 .001 
Presence of one, or more than one 166 2.7 independent directors 
dAdju~ted I for unequal variances 
Hypothesis 1 
There are significant differences in the financial performance (ROA, ROE, EPS) 
of TSEC listed electronic companies according to the number of independent directors as 
follows: three independent directors > two independent directors > one independent 
director > 0 independent director. 
The Number of Independent Directors and Company Performance: 
ANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons 
As shown in Table 2, of the entire 288 companies, there were 122 companies 
without any independent director; of the 166 companies with independent directors, 37 
companies with one independent director presence, 107 companies with two independent 
directors, and 22 companies with three independent directors. This was an unbalanced 
distribution of companies per group, heavily represented by companies with 0 directors 
and 2 directors. The ROA means for the four groups (0, 1, 2, 3) were 2.41, 6.27, 8.14, 
and 10.71 respectively. The ROE means for the four groups were 1.04, 7.61, 12.13, and 
16.79 respectively. The EPS means for the four groups are 1.16, 2.41, 2.53, and 3.85 
respectively. As the number of independent directors increased, it was observed that the 
ROA, ROE, and EPS also increased. These descriptive findings support the 
hypothesized relationships that board member with 3>2>1>0. However, the sample size 
for companies with one and three directors may be insufficient in size to reveal 
significant differences. 
Descriptive Statistics o f  Four Groups with the Presence qf'lndependent Numbers of' 
Independent Directors 
- - 
Number of 
independent. Std. 
Directors N Mean Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum 
ROA 0 122 2.41 12.22 1.10 -42.00 35.10 
I 37 6.27 10.62 1.74 -23.62 38.00 
2 107 8.14 1 1.42 1.10 -43.12 42.07 
3 22 10.71 13.02 2.77 -14.64 35.34 
ROE 0 122 1.04 33.12 2.99 -147.89 185.00 
1 37 7.61 19.95 3.28 -58.58 69.00 
2 107 12.13 17.42 1.68 -6 1.20 47.34 
3 22 16.79 19.62 4.18 -22.34 46.00 
EPS 0 122 1.16 3.77 .34 -7.05 21.31 
1 37 2.41 5.75 .94 -7.54 33.26 
2 107 2.53 3.20 .3 1 -5.75 15.87 
3 22 3.85 4.15 .88 -2.4 1 13.86 
Total 288 2.04 3.98 .23 -7.54 33.26 
To test Hypothesis 1, three ANOVAs were used to determine if any of the three 
different company performance measures (ROA, ROE, and EPS) differed significantly 
from each other according to the number of independent directors. The means of ROA, 
ROE, and EPS differed significantly as shown in Table 3 ( F  = 6.074, p = .001 for ROA; 
F = 4.682, p = .003 for ROE; F = 4.278, p = ,006 for EPS). Consequently, hypothesis 1 
was supported in part, that there were significant differences in the financial performance 
(ROA, ROE, EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies according to the number of 
independent directors. 
ANOVA ofFour Groups with the Absence or Presence qf'Diffbrent Numbers of' 
Independent Directors by ROA, ROE, and EPS 
df Mean Sum of Squares Square F P 
ROA Between 
Groups 2538.647 3 846.216 6.074 .OO 1 
Within 
Groups 
ROE Between 
Groups 9265.466 3 3088.489 4.682 ,003 
Within 
Groups 187346.267 284 659.670 
EPS Between 
Groups 197.514 3 65.838 4.278 ,006 
Within 
G r o u ~ s  
As a result of significant differences between the groups, the rigorous Scheffe 
post hoc test for individual pair wise comparisons was conducted and results are shown in 
Table 4. This Scheffe post hoc test provided the opportunity to test sub hypotheses that 
the differences in the financial performance (ROA, ROE, EPS) of TSEC listed electronic 
companies according to the number of independent directors were as follows: three 
independent directors > two independent directors > one independent director > 0 
independent. The results of pair wise comparisons are discussed; however, it is noted 
again, that the distribution of companies within the four groups was not even. Groups 
with 0 and with 2 independent directors constituted the majority of the sample. 
(1) For ROA performance, there were significant mean differences between the group of 
companies with 0 independent directors and companies with two independent 
directors, as well as the group of companies with 0 independent directors and the 
group of companies with three independent directors (-5.73, p = .004 and -336. p 
= ,026). However, there were no significant mean differences between the 0 
independent directors and the one independent director group of companies (-3.86, p 
= ,387). In sum, comparing with 0 independent directors, the ROA performance of 
companies with only one independent director in the boardroom was lower than the 
ROA performance compared with companies with two or three independent directors 
in the boardroom. While there was an increase in ROA corresponding to an increase 
in the number of independent directors, there were no significant differences between 
any two groups of companies with the presence of independent directors, such as one 
independent director and two independent directors, one independent director and 
three independent directors, as well as two and three independent directors. This 
finding may be due to sample size in groups of two and three independent directors. 
The sub hypothesis for ROA that three independent directors > two independent 
directors > one independent director > 0 independent was not supported. 
(2) For ROE performance, there were significant mean differences only between the 
group of companies with 0 independent directors and the group of companies with 
two independent directors (-1 1.09, p = .015). Therefore, there were no significant 
differences between the group of companies with 0 independent directors and the 
group of companies with one or three independent directors. In addition, there were 
no significant differences between any two groups of companies with the presence of 
independent directors, such as one independent director and two independent 
directors, one independent director and three independent directors, as well as two 
independent directors and three independent directors. There were no significant 
differences in the ROE performance of TSEC electronic companies with the absence 
or presence of independent directors (0, 1, 2, and 3) ,  although there were the only 
significant differences between the absence of independent and the presence of two 
independent directors. This finding may be due to sample size in groups of two and 
three independent directors. . The sub hypothesis for ROE that three independent 
directors > two independent directors > one independent director > 0 independent was 
not supported. 
(3)  For EPS performance, there were significant mean differences only between the 
group of companies with 0 independent directors and the group of companies with 
three independent directors (-2.68, p = .0034). Therefore, there were no significant 
differences between the group of companies with 0 independent directors and the 
group of companies with one or two independent directors (-1.25, p = .411; -1.37, p 
= .075). In addition, there were no significant differences between any two groups 
of companies with the presence of independent directors, such as one independent 
director and two independent directors, one independent director and three 
independent directors, as well as two and three independent directors (-.12, p = .999; 
- 1 . 4 3 , ~  = .604; - 1 . 3 1 , ~  = .561). 
There were no significant differences in the EPS performance of TSEC 
electronic companies with the absence or presence of independent directors (0,  1, 2, 
and 3),  although there were the only significant differences between the absence of 
independent and the presence of three independent directors. This finding may be 
due to sample size in groups of two and three independent directors. The sub 
hypothesis for EPS that three independent directors > two independent directors > 
one independent director > 0 independent was not supported. 
In sum, the above three findings indicated there are no significant differences in 
the financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of TSEC electronic companies with the 
absence or presence of independent directors (0, 1, 2, and 3), although there are 
significant differences between the absence of independent directors and the presence of 
independent directors. This finding may be due to sample size in groups of one and 
three independent directors. The sub hypotheses for ROA, ROE, and EPS that three 
independent directors > two independent directors > one independent director > 0 
independent were not supported. 
Post Hoc Comparisons of  Significant Differences in ROA, ROE, and EPS by Using 
Scheffe Test According to the Number of Independent Directors 
Number of Number of 
Independent Independent Mean 
Dependent Directors Directors Difference Standard 
Variable (1) (J) (1-J) Error P 
ROA 0 1 -3.86 2.21 ,387 
2 -5.73) 1.56 ,004 
3 -8.36) 2.73 .026 
I 0 3.86 2.2 1 .387 
2 -1.87 2.25 ,875 
3 -4.50 3.17 .572 
2 0 5.73 1.56 .004 
1 1.87 2.25 3 7 5  
3 -2.62 2.76 ,824 
3 0 8.36 2.73 ,026 
I 4.50 3.17 ,572 
2 2.62 2.76 .824 
ROE 
EPS 
Hypothesis 2 
The number of director training hours significantly explains financial 
performance of TSEC listed electronic companies. 
Board Training Hours and Company Performance: 
Simple Regression Analyses 
To examine Hypothesis 2, three simple regression analyses were used to explain 
the relationship between board training hours and the company's performance for the 304 
accessible companies. Due to the exclusion criteria, 288 companies were tested. In this 
study, the dependent variables are ROA, ROE, and EPS, and the predictor variable is 
board training hours. As shown in Table 5, the mean values of board training hours, 
ROA, ROE, and EPS were 45.45,5.67,7.21, and 2.04 respectively. 
Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviation for Board Training Hours and Company Performance by 
ROA, ROE, and EPS 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Board Training Hours 45.45 85.75 288 
ROA 5.67 12.11 288 
ROE 7.2 1 26.17 288 
EPS 2.04 3.98 288 
As shown in Table 6, the F values (5.156 for ROA, 4.220 for ROE, and 3.670 for 
EPS) for the regression equations were significant (p = .024 for ROA, p = .041 for ROE, 
and p = .056 for EPS), although (p = .056 for EPS) was only slightly higher than 
significance level (p < .05). The F value is the mean square regression divided by mean 
square residual (George & Mallery, 2003). Therefore hypothesis 2 is supported. 
Table 6 
ANOVAs for Board Training Hours and Company Performance by ROA, ROE, and EPS 
Dependent Source of Sum of Mean 
Variables Mean Variation Squares df Square F P 
RO A 5.67 Regression 745.55 1 745.555 5.156 .024a 
Residual 41358.72 286 144.61 1 
Total 42 104.27 287 
ROE 7.2 1 Regression 2858.89 1 2858.894 4.220 .04Ia 
Residual 193752.84 286 677.457 
Total 19661 1.73 287 
EPS 2.04 Regression 57.89 1 57.890 3.670 .056= 
Residual 45 10.84 286 15.772 
Total 4568.73 287 
a Predictors: (Constant), Board Training Hours 
As shown in Table 7, the t values (t = 2.271 for ROA, t = 2.054 for ROE, and t = 
1.916 for EPS) for the individual regression equations were significant O) = .024 for ROA, 
p = .041 for ROE, and p = .056 for EPS) except the slightly higher p = ,056 (> .05) for 
EPS. The constant and coefficient of board training hours, as shown in Table 7, 
indicated three regression models with constants (4.816 for ROA equation, 5.528 for 
ROE equation, and 1.804 for EPS equation) and coefficients (0.019 for ROA equation, 
0.037 for ROE equation, and 0.005 for EPS equation). 
Table 7 
Constants and CoeIficient.~ of Board Training Hours jhr ROA. ROE, and EPS Equations 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients I P 
Dependent Variables B SE Beta @) 
ROA Constant 4.816 ,803 5.994 .OOO 
Board Training Hours .0 19 ,008 ,133 2.271 ,024 
ROE Constant 5.528 1.739 3.179 ,002 
Board Training Hours ,037 ,018 .I21 2.054 ,041 
EPS Constant 1.804 ,265 6.800 ,000 
Board Training Hours .005 .003 .I 13 1.916 .056 
In Table 8, the R, R ~ ,  and adjusted R~ for the explanatory relationship between 
board training hours and company performance by ROA, ROE, and EPS were presented. 
The R~ value is the proportion of variance in one variable accounted for (or explained) by 
the other variable. Therefore, the three R2 values (.018 for ROA, .015 for ROE, 
and ,013 for EPS) indicated the proportion of variance, that the individual regression 
equations can be explained by using the board training hours, were respectively less than 
2% of the variation in company performance. However, only one explanatory variable 
was entered into the model. The adjusted R2 (.014 for ROA, .O11 for ROE, and .009 for 
EPS), was less as expected. The number of board training hours significantly explains 
about 1% to 1.5% of financial performance of TSEC listed electronic companies. 
R, R', and Adjusted ~ ~ , f b r  Board Trcrining Hours and Company Pecfijrmnnce by ROA, 
ROE, and EPS 
Dependent R R' Adjusted R' Std. Error of 
Variables the Estimate 
ROA ,133" .O 18 .014 12.025 
ROE .12Ia .O 15 .O 1 1 26.028 
EPS .I 13a .013 ,009 3.971 
a Predictors: (Constant), Board Training Hours 
Hypothesis 3 
The number of independent directors and the number of board of directors' 
training hours are significant explanatory variables of financial performance (ROA, ROE, 
and EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies. 
Number of Independent Directors and Number of Board Training Hours and 
Company Performance: Multiple Regression Analyses 
Multiple regression analysis shows the influence of two or more variables on a 
designated dependent variable. In this study, multiple regression analysis was used to 
examine the relationship between the number of independent directors and the number of 
board training hours, and company performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS). 
As shown in Table 9, in terms of the ROA performance, the F value (1 1.3 12) for 
the overall regression equation was significant (p  = ,000). Hypothesis 3, that the 
number of independent board of directors and the number of director training hours was 
supported for the financial indicator of ROA. The adjusted ~ '=.067 (coefficient of 
determination, adjusted for sample size and the number of predictor variables) indicates 
the regression equation using the two independent variables explained 6.7% of the 
variation in the ROA performance. 
To analyze the individual predictors, the t value, which is the regression 
coefficient divided by the standard error (BISE), was significant for the number of 
independent directors and the number of board training hours ( t  = 4.14, p = ,000; t = 2.07, 
p = .039). In terms of the relative influence, the number of independent directors was 
more important than the number of board training hours @= ,237 >P= .119). Both were 
positively related to ROA performance. As a result, both of the independent variables 
were significant in explanation of the dependent variable. Other board characteristics 
variables need to be included in regression models to further explain financial 
performance. 
Table 9 
Multiple Regressions of Number of Independent Directors and Number of Board 
Training Hours and ROA Performance 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients t P 
B SE Beta (/I) 
ROA: 
Constant 1.892 1.053 1.79 
.073 
Number of Independent 
Directors 2.741 .66 1 ,237 4.14 ,000 
Number of Board Training Hours ,017 ,008 ,119 2.07 ,039 
N= 288 
F=l1.3 12 df=2 p=.000 Adjusted ~ ~ = . 0 6 7  
As shown in Table 10, in terms of the ROE performance, the F value (8.849) for 
overall regression equation was significant (p  = ,000). Hypothesis 3, that the number of 
independent board of directors and the number of director training hours, was supported 
for the financial indicator of ROE. The adjusted ~ ~ = . 0 5 2  indicates the regression 
equation using the two independent variables explained 5.2% of the variation in the ROE 
performance. 
To analyze the individual predictors, the t value was significant for the number of 
independent directors (t  = 3.64, p = .000), but not significant for the number of board 
training hours ( t  = 1.87, p = ,062). In terms of the relative influence, the number of 
independent directors was more important than the number of board training hours @ 
= .210 > /3 = .108) in explaining ROE performance. 
Table 10 
Multiple Regression of Number of Independent Directors and Number of Board Training 
Hours and ROE Performance 
Standardized 
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients t P 
B Std. Error Beta (/3) 
ROE: 
Constant -.077 2.294 -.03 ,973 
Number of Independent 
Directors 5.254 1.441 .2 10 3.64 ,000 
Number of Board Training Hours .033 ,018 ,108 1.87 ,062 
N=288 
F=8.849 df=2 p=.000 Adjusted ~ ~ = . 0 5 2  
As shown in Table 1 I ,  in terms of the EPS performance, the F value (7.529) for 
overall regression equation was significant 0, = .001). Hypothesis 3, that the number of 
independent board of directors and the number of director training hours was supported 
for the financial indicator of EPS. The adjusted R2=.044 indicates the regression 
equation using the two independent variables explained 4.4% of the variation in the ROE 
performance. 
To analyze the individual predictors, the t value was only significant for the 
number of independent directors (t  = 3.355, p = .001), but not significant for the number 
of board training hours ( t  = 1.743, p = ,082). In terms of the relative influence, the 
number of independent directors was more important than the number of board training 
hours@= .194>P= .101). 
Table 11 
Multiple Regressions of Number of Independent Directors and Number of Board 
Training Hours and EPS Performance 
Standardized 
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefticients t P 
B Std. Error Beta@') 
EPS: 
Constant 1.015 .35 1 2.889 ,004 
Number of Independent 
Directors 
Number of Board Training Hours ,005 ,003 ,101 1.743 .082 
N=288 
F=7.529 d P 2  p=.001 Adjusted R2=.044 
In sum, using three multiple regression analyses to examine Hypothesis 3, and 
only two explanatory variables about board characteristics, findings indicated that the 
number of independent directors and the number of board of directors training hours were 
significant explanatory variables of financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of 
TSEC listed electronic companies, and Hypothesis 3, was supported. The number of the 
independent directors and board training hours was significant in explaining between 4% 
and 7% of the ROA, ROE, and EPS performance, using the adjusted R ~ .  The number of 
the independent directors was significant in explaining each of the ROA, ROE, and EPS 
indicators of financial performance. Of the three financial indicators, the number of 
board training hours was a significant explanatory variable of ROA only. 
Chapter IV presented the results of data analyses including descriptive statistics, 
independent-sample t tests, ANOVAs, simple regression analyses, and multiple 
regression analyses. Findings showed there were significant differences in financial 
performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies according to 
the presence or absence of independent directors, using independent t-test (research 
question 1). Furthermore, using ANOVA for differences in financial performance 
(ROA, ROE, and EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies according to 0, 1, 2, and 3 
independent directors were significant as well (partly supporting hypothesis 1). 
However, although there was a corresponding increase in financial performance (ROA, 
ROE, and EPS) according to the number of board of independent directors, only 
differences between 0 and 2 directors were significant. These two groups also 
constituted a majority of the sample. Therefore, the sub hypotheses of hypothesis 1 for 
ROA, ROE, and EPS that three independent directors > two independent directors > one 
independent director > 0 independent, was not supported. 
Additionally, findings of simple regression analyses indicated that the number of 
board training hours significantly explained about 1% of financial performance of TSEC 
listed electronic companies. Results of multiple regression analyses demonstrated that 
the number of independent directors and the number of board of directors training hours 
were significant explanatory variables of about 7% of financial performance (ROA, ROE, 
and EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies. Chapter V provides a detailed 
discussion of the findings in terms of interpretations, implications, conclusions, and 
recommendations. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Summary 
Many academic and investment market researchers in America believe that 
independent directors should be more numerically dominant on public company boards 
than they are today. Nevertheless, studies have found no significant evidence that 
companies appointing a majority of independent directors in the boardroom perform 
better than companies without such independent directors (Bhagat & Black, 2002). 
Since the financial crises in East Asia (1997-98) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOA), the American market system of corporate governance is spreading all over 
the world. In Taiwan, the enactment of the amended "Security and Exchange Act" in 
2006 required all listed companies to appoint independent directors, not less than two in 
number and not less than one-fifth of the total number of directors (Taiwan Security and 
Exchange Act, 2006). 
In order to explore the independent director mechanism already implemented in 
Taiwan's corporate governance system, this study examined the effects of independent 
directors and board training in TSEC electronic companies. In this research, 
independent directors were measured by the presence or absence of independent directors 
and the number of independent directors in the boardroom. Board members' training 
was measured by the training hours of the board of directors. Company performance 
was measured by financial indicators in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS. 
Using the official secondary data to examine the question and hypotheses, 
findings indicated that the presence or absence of independent directors significantly 
affected the company's financial performance for TSEC electronic companies. 
Nevertheless, using the Scheffe Post Hoc comparisons, findings indicated there are no 
significant differences in the financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of TSEC 
electronic companies with different number of independent directors (0, 1, 2, and 3). 
Furthermore, results of simple regression analyses indicated that the number of board 
training hours significantly explains about 1% of financial performance of TSEC listed 
electronic companies. Results of multiple regression analyses demonstrated that the 
number of independent directors and the number of board of directors training hours were 
significant explanatory variables of about 7% of financial performance (ROA, ROE, and 
EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies. Chapter 5 presents the interpretations, 
limitations, implications, recommendations, and conclusions concerning the independent 
directors and company performance, and board training in TSEC electronic companies. 
Interpretations 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
The research question and two hypotheses addressed the purposes of this study. 
Specific purposes of this quantitative causal-comparative study were: (1) to determine if 
there are significant differences in company performance between two groups of listed 
Taiwanese electronic companies with the absence or presence of independent directors; 
(2) to examine the effect of the number of independent directors (0, 1, 2, 3) on company 
performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS, in TSEC electronic companies; (3) to 
examine the explanatory relationship between board members' training and company 
performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS in TSEC electronic companies; and, (4) to 
examine the explanatory relationship between the number of independent board directors 
and the number of training hours and company performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS). 
Research Question 
For the Research Question, to determine if the absence or presence of independent 
directors significantly affected the company's financial performance or not, findings 
indicated that there were significant differences in company performance between these 
two groups of listed Taiwanese electronic companies. Nonetheless, the results are 
questionable. 
Bhagat and Black (2002) state, "An important issue in studying the correlation 
between board composition and firm performance is the direction of causation. Board 
composition could affect firm performance, but firm performance can also cause the firm 
to change its board composition" (p. 232). In this study, using independent-sample 
t-test, it was shown that the companies having independent directors do have better 
company performance, although the direction of causation is still uncertain. While the 
appointment of independent directors is not yet enforced by law, companies performing 
outstandingly likely prefer to appoint independent directors for their reputation only, not 
because independent directors actually could help the business operation. Conversely, 
companies performing poorly likely prefer not to appoint independent directors in order 
to keep the company's operation in the cabinet of the mysterious board. 
Therefore, it may not be the competencies of independent director that benefit the 
company performance, the relationship between independent directors and company 
performance is endogenous (Bhagat & Black, 2002). "Board independence could affect 
future firm performance, but a firm's need for a particular board structure, the firm's past 
performance and other factors could also affect the firm's future board composition" 
(Bhagat & Black, 2002, p. 236). 
While the need for independent directors or even independent boards (a majority 
of directors are independent) has become conventional wisdom of corporate governance, 
commentators "often differ over what constitutes director independence and how it 
effectuates the aims of corporate governance reform" (Anonymous, 2006, p. 1). 
Hypothesis 1 focused on the effect of the number of independent directors. 
Hypothesis 1 
Using ANOVA for differences in financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of 
TSEC listed electronic companies according to 0, 1, 2, and 3 independent directors were 
significant as well (partly supporting Hypothesis 1). Although there was a 
corresponding increase in financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) according to the 
number of board of independent directors, only differences between 0 and 2 directors 
were significant. These two groups also constituted a majority of the sample. 
Therefore, the sub hypotheses of Hypothesis 1 for ROA, ROE, and EPS that three 
independent directors > two independent directors > one independent director > 0 
independent, was not supported. 
There are possibilities that don't favor the effectiveness of more independent 
directors on company performance. One possibility, as stated in the previous section, is 
that their relationship is endogenous. A second possibility is that independent directors 
need more incentives to complete monitoring and advisory tasks for the company, such as 
greater share ownership, or stock options (Fich & Shivdasani, 2005). For example, 
Bhagat and Black (2002) indicate "there is some evidence that greater share ownership 
may improve independent directors' performance" (p. 246). A third possibility is that 
"today's independent directors are not independent enough" (p. 246). Companies need 
independent directors to be not only superficially independent of management but also 
substantially accountable to shareholders (Bhagat & Black, 2002). 
A fourth possibility is that some independent directors "are beholden to the 
company or its current CEO in ways too subtle to be captured in customary definitions of 
independence" (Bhagat & Black, 2002, p. 246). For instance, independent directors 
may be the CEO's college classmates, or they may be employed by a foundation 
receiving financial aid from the company. A fifth possibility is that independent 
directors are not assigned to an appropriate committee which reflects their individual 
expertise. For example, an independent director with human resources expertise is 
assigned to the audit committee that needs more financial expertise. One other 
possibility is that independent directors may be at a disadvantage when they do not have 
particular expertise, such as close knowledge background of the company's industry 
(Bhagat & Black, 2002). 
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 
Board members' training is implemented in order to reinforce directors' business 
capability, which should lead to an enhancement of board effectiveness and company 
performance. Using simple regression analyses for Hypothesis 2, the number of board 
training hours as an explanatory variable of the company's financial performance was 
supported, and findings indicated that the number of board training hours significantly 
explains about 1% of financial performance of TSEC listed electronic companies. For 
Hypothesis 3, findings of multiple regression analyses demonstrated that the number of 
independent directors and the number of board of directors training hours were 
significant explanatory variables of about 7% of financial performance (ROA. ROE, and 
EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies. 
To encourage directors' continuous learning and training, the TSEC conducted 
research and promulgated "Guideline for Promotion of Advanced Study by Directors and 
Supervisors of TSECJGTSM Listed Companies" (TSEC, 2006). In the guideline, a 
newly recruited director of TSEC listed companies is advised to take at least 12 hours of 
training courses for the recruiting year, and at least 3 hours for each of the following 
years of tenure. 
It is difficult to build an effective board without effective directors. "There are 
three factors which constitute an effective director: (i) director independence, (ii) director 
competencies, (iii) director behavior" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 7). Measures of 
director competence "include the directors' general, functional, firm-specific and 
board-specific knowledge and skills. Relational, social and intellectual capacity or 
capability may also be included as competence" (Huse, 2005, p. 8). As reported by 
Huse (2005), Sundaramurthy and Lewis claimed the dynamism of actual board behavior 
and corporate governance is rooted in various learning and influencing loops. Besides, 
"the learning processes take place at various levels: societal and institutional, 
organizational, group and individual" (Huse, 2005, p. 9). 
Consequently, effective board training needs to be explored in terms of the types 
of training programs, such as subject design, training methods, evaluation of training, and 
motivation of training. In particular, to meet the individual company's requirement, 
custom-made training programs would be better than generalized courses, which were 
mostly adopted and reported by the companies examined in this study. In general, 
besides training hours, more measures examining directors' training are needed for 
advanced study. 
Practical Implications 
1. An effective board needs independent directors to benefit the company not only 
directly for better financial performance but for its reputation of compliance with the 
government regulation and the functioning of objective monitoring. 
2. The effectiveness of independent directors must be built on their competencies and 
behavior as well, not just on his or her regulatory independence status. 
3. The absence or presence of independent directors affects a company's financial 
performance, but there is no significant evidence that appointing more independent 
directors may enhance company's financial performance in this study. Therefore, an 
independent board with a majority of independent directors may not necessarily be 
essential to good corporate governance. 
4. For government regulations, the over-emphasis on board structure should be 
augmented by enhancing director competencies and behavior. 
5. There was no empirical support for current government regulation that companies are 
required to appoint independent directors, not less than two in number and not less 
than one-fifth of the total number of directors (Taiwan Security and Exchange Act, 
2006). 
6. Results of simple regression and multiple regression analyses indicated that 
independent directors and board training hours are significant in explaining financial 
performance of TSEC electronic companies. The implementation of board training 
needs to be reinforced and emphasize the variety and quality of the training program. 
Conclusions 
1. The proposition that director independence is beneficial to corporate governance and 
company performance has become conventional wisdom. The investors and 
regulators not only in the U.S. but also in other countries with different corporate 
governance systems embrace this belief to reform corporate governance. 
2. In this study, although the companies having independent directors do have better 
company performance, the direction of causation is still uncertain. It may not be 
the competencies of an independent director that benefit the company performance; 
the relationship between independent directors and company performance may be 
endogenous. Independent directors could affect future company performance, but 
a company's need for a particular board structure, the company's past performance 
and other factors such as government regulation could also affect the company's 
appointment of independent directors. 
3. Overall, within the range of independent directors appointed in TSEC electronic 
companies, there is no significant evidence that appointing more independent 
directors may enhance company's financial performance. Particularly, there is no 
empirical support for current government regulation that companies are required to 
appoint independent directors, not less than two in number and not less than 
one-fifth of the total number of directors. 
4. The board members' training is implemented to reinforce directors' business 
capability, which should enhance board effectiveness and company performance. 
In this study, results of simple regression and multiple regression analyses indicated 
that independent directors and board training hours are significant in explaining 
companies' financial performance. To enhance the explanation for better 
effectiveness and financial performance, board training needs to be explored in 
terms of the type of training programs, such as subject design, training methods, 
evaluation of training, and motivation of training. 
5. Empirical studies in the literature and in this study demonstrate that quantitative or 
statistical correlations between company performance and variables of corporate 
governance don't get to the causality of what leads to good corporate governance. 
Focusing on what happens behind the board curtain through qualitative research 
methods may be more beneficial for building good corporate governance. 
Limitations 
1. Research of independent directors, board training, and company performance is 
limited to the listed electronic public companies in Taiwan, which have a hybrid 
corporate governance model approaching the American market model. 
2. The history of independent directors and board training has not been long and not 
enforced since it was set forth for Taiwan's listed companies in 2002; therefore, the 
implementation of the regulations is still developing. 
3. To measure company performance in this study, only three financial indicators (ROA, 
ROE, and EPS) were used. There are other criteria which may be used, from 
financial dimensions such as EVA (Economic Value Added), PIE ratios, market value 
of stocks, and from social dimensions such as social responsibility indicators, and 
environmental protection compliances under the hybrid corporate governance system, 
4. The quality of board training as measured by the types of training programs, training 
methods, and subject matters, may perform as significantly as the quantity of training 
hours. Quality of board training was not researched in this study. 
5. Due to the limitations of time and manpower, exploratory research using qualitative 
methods such as interviews and observations to collect the perceptions of the relevant 
respondents toward independent directors and board training was not conducted in 
this study. 
Recommendations for Future Study 
1. The implementation of regulations with regard to an independent director's 
appointment has not been long in Taiwan. It is necessary in the hture to examine 
the evolution of effects of these regulations by using longitudinal research instead of 
the cross-sectional research used in this study. 
2. To measure company performance in this study, only three financial indicators (ROA, 
ROE, and EPS) were used. There are still some other criteria which may be used for 
future study from financial dimensions such as EVA (Economic Value Added), PIE 
ratios, market value of stocks, or social dimensions such as social responsibility 
indicators, and environmental protection compliances under the hybrid corporate 
governance system. 
3. Future research should assess the independent director's compensation system to 
demonstrate the effect of incentives, such as share ownership and stock options, on an 
independent director's performance. 
4. The corporate governance literature has begun to examine closely the behavioral 
aspects and group processes that underlie board dynamics, but more studies in the 
future regarding board processes, particularly by using a qualitative method or a 
mixed method, are still needed. 
5 .  Besides board training hours, more measures examining the effects of board training 
on board effectiveness and company performance are needed for the future study of 
corporate governance. 
6. For better corporate governance, the implementation of independent director and 
board members' training needs to be incorporated into other mechanisms such as the 
settings of board meetings, and meetings of the audit committee, the nomination 
committee, and the compensation committee. These factors can be regarded as 
independent or context variables to be examined in the future. 
7. In this study, listed electronic companies were selected as the population to conduct 
the research. However, it is possible for industry-based differences among boards of 
directors to affect their functioning as groups. Comparing the performance of 
independent directors in various industries is needed in future studies. 
8. In Taiwan, more process-oriented research on corporate governance is needed in the 
hture, rather than the over-emphasis on board structure found in past research. 
9. The operation and performance of Taiwan's enterprises are closely related to their 
investments in mainland China. Therefore, research should be conducted in 
enterprises in which Taiwanese firms have invested in mainland China. 
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Appendix A 
Secondary Data From TSEC 









* Data incomplete 
EXIND (0,I): the existence of independent directors in the boardroom (independent 
variable) 
NOIND (1,2,3): the number of independent directors in the boardroom (independent 
variable) 
BTHS: the number of completed board members' training hours 
ROA, ROE, and EPS: financial indicators 
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